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To cite this article: Jana Krause, Werner Krause & Piia Bränfors (2018) Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace, *International Interactions*, 44:6, 985-1016, DOI: [10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386](https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2018.1492386>



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Published online: 10 Aug 2018.



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## Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace

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### ABSTRACT

There is an emerging consensus that women's participation in peace negotiations contributes to the quality and durability of peace after civil war. However, to date, this proposition has remained empirically untested. Moreover, how women's participation may contribute to durable peace has not been systematically explored. This article uses a mixed method design to examine this proposition. Our statistical analysis demonstrates a robust correlation between peace agreements signed by female delegates and durable peace. We further find that agreements signed by women show a significantly higher number of peace agreement provisions aimed at political reform, and higher implementation rates for provisions. We argue that linkages between women signatories and women civil society groups explain the observed positive impact of women's direct participation in peace negotiations. Collaboration and knowledge building among diverse women groups contributes to better content of peace agreements and higher implementation rates of agreement provisions. We substantiate this argument with qualitative case study evidence and demonstrate how collaboration between female delegates and women civil society groups positively impacts peace processes. Our findings support the assumption that women's participation in peace negotiations increases the durability and the quality of peace.

### KEYWORDS

Conflict; durable peace; gender; peace negotiations; women

More than 15 years after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which called for strengthening women and girls' protection from conflict-related sexual violence and women's equal participation in all stages of the prevention and resolution of conflict, women's participation in peace negotiations with voice and influence remains exceptional rather than the norm. The international community increasingly acknowledges this participation gap and the lack of systematic and in-depth research (UN 2015). Addressing this gap is important because peace negotiations can be a window of opportunity for increasing women's political participation in a postconflict country (Anderson 2016). For example, postconflict African countries enjoy

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considerably higher rates of female legislative representation and a faster trajectory of adopting women's rights reforms in comparison to non-post-conflict countries on the continent because women groups seized the opportunity for political reform (Tripp 2015). Durable peace is generally more likely in countries with higher levels of gender equality that allow for women's political participation (Gizelis 2009).

This article focuses on peace negotiations and the participation of "local" women who represent either a conflict party or civil society. Does women's participation in peace negotiations have a positive impact on the quality and the durability of peace, independent of international peacekeeping, the participation of civil society actors, and other factors related to gender equality? To date, we lack empirical analysis that shows that women's direct participation positively impacts the durability as well as the quality of peace after civil war. Furthermore, there are competing theoretical explanations as to why and how women's participation positively impacts peace durability. Case study research has focused on women's participation as civil society activists who pressure warring parties to conclude an agreement, and as delegates who set agendas that often prioritize women's rights and broader issues related to the quality of peace. Some policy documents remain unhelpfully rooted in essentialist assumptions about women's inherently peaceful nature to explain their assumed positive influence on peace processes. However, such assumptions cloud our understanding of the mechanisms that causally link women's participation to durable peace. To date, one comparative study indicates that women's participation in peace processes contributes both to the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement and to its successful implementation (O'Reilly et al. 2015). We also know that women's security and the socioeconomic and political status of women directly impact the likelihood of (renewed) civil war (Caprioli 2005; Hudson et al. 2012, 2009; Melander 2005). Based on these findings, we test whether women's meaningful participation in peace negotiations positively impacts the quality and the durability of peace.

We apply a mixed method design, or nested analysis (Lieberman 2005). First, we statistically test the impact of women's participation in peace negotiations on the durability of peace and find a robust correlation. Second, we analyze descriptive statistics of peace accord content and implementation rates and find that agreements with women signatories show better accord quality and higher implementation rates. Third, we provide brief case studies that trace the mechanism of linkages between women signatories and women civil society groups to explain the observed positive impact of women's participation on both quality and durability of peace.

For our statistical analysis, we coded all peace agreements that are included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data set for female signatories. We do not argue that women who participate in peace negotiations automatically change negotiation dynamics or the peace process.

Oftentimes, women members of negotiation teams may not participate with a voice or may be excluded from important backroom negotiations. However, women and women groups who signed peace agreements can be assumed to have directly participated in negotiations, with voice and influence. We find that women signatories include a diverse range of political actors: female members of armed groups, female government representatives, and female delegates from civil society groups. Our findings indicate that between 1990 and 2014, out of 130 peace agreements, women signed only 13. Contrary to common expectations, our data show that the number of women who signed peace agreements has *not* increased since UNSCR 1325 has been adopted in 2000. Despite the modest number of peace agreements signed by women, our statistical analysis indicates a robust relationship between women signatories and the durability of peace. Furthermore, we also find that peace agreements signed by women include a higher number of agreement provisions and a higher rate of provision implementation 10 years after the agreement compared to those not signed by women. Thus, we conclude that women's participation in negotiations positively impacts the quality and the durability of peace.

Why does the presence of female signatories among conflict parties positively impact the quality and the durability of peace? We argue that *linkages* between women civil society groups and female signatories positively impact accord content and implementation. Both quality of accord content and provisions' implementation rate contribute to a longer lasting peace (Joshi and Quinn 2015, 2017). Collaboration between female delegates and women civil society groups is important because civil society is gendered and the general participation of civil society groups does not automatically imply that women groups receive access to influence the negotiations. For example, in Guatemala (1991–1995), Luz Mendez, the only female member of the rebel Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) delegation and a signatory to several agreements of the peace process, collaborated with women civil society groups that did not have direct access to the negotiations. This linkage contributed to unprecedented commitments to gender equality in the peace accords and resulted in crucial networks between a diverse range of women activists, which supported provision implementation with regard to women's security and their political, social, and economic rights. We use qualitative case study evidence to demonstrate the existence of these linkages in peace processes with women signatories.

This article proceeds as follows: We first examine the literature on peace agreements and durability of peace and find that peace accord quality and implementation rate emerges as the strongest predictor for durable peace. We then review research on women's participation in peace negotiations and the gender equality and peace hypothesis. Based on this, we present two hypotheses: Women's direct participation in peace negotiations, that is

female signatories, positively impacts (1) the durability and (2) the quality of peace. Second, we develop a theory to explain why women's participation in negotiations contributes to the durability and the quality of peace. We argue that linkages between female signatories and women civil society groups contribute to the quality and content of a peace accord and to its implementation. Third, we discuss our research design and data and test our first hypothesis using a Cox model for duration analysis. We find a robust statistical relationship between women signatories and the durability of peace. The small number of peace agreements signed by women delegates does not allow us to test for selection bias with advanced statistical means. We therefore discuss the possibility of selection bias descriptively and draw on a qualitative comparison of the key characteristics of peace agreements with women signatories. Fourth, we examine our second hypothesis and analyze descriptive statistics of peace accord provisions and implementation for agreements with and without female signatories, drawing on data from the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) data set. Fifth, we provide brief case study evidence of linkages between female signatories and women civil society groups. We discuss these linkages in more detail for the well-documented case of Liberia, a country that has made remarkable progress in the implementation of women's rights and political representation after the war.

In sum, our findings support the argument that women's direct participation in peace negotiations with voice increases the quality and durability of peace. While further research is needed into the emergence and transformation of women networks during peace processes, and on the impact of civil society more broadly, our analysis has important implications for research and policy practice.

## **Peace Agreements and the Durability of Peace**

Looking at previous research on durable peace after civil war, studies have identified a broad range of factors that impact the durability of peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothschild 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Nilsson 2012; Walter 2004). First, Page Fortna (2008) showed that peace lasts significantly longer when international personnel are deployed and that peacekeepers tend to go to the most difficult places. Scholars further argued that power-sharing provisions in negotiated settlements positively impact durable peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), especially when parties engage in costly concessions by implementing military and territorial provisions on power sharing (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).

Second, the inclusion of civil society representatives has been found to improve the legitimacy of the agreements reached and, thus, to increase chances for a lasting end to war (Belloni 2008; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St John and Kew 2008). Civil society participation

increases public representation and brings local, context-sensitive knowledge to the table, which supports implementing accord provisions at the local level (Prendergast and Plumb 2002). Direct civil society participation is particularly significant in undemocratic conflict contexts and engineers ownership of the peace agreement, which is vital for political and democratic development (Prendergast and Plumb 2002; Wanis St-John and Kew 2008). Civil society inclusion may also send a strong signal to warring parties that there is very limited societal support for continued violence, which could mitigate commitment problems (Nilsson 2012: 250).

Third, recent research has demonstrated that peace accord content and implementation of accord provisions emerge as the strongest predictors for durable peace. Negotiations allow civil war actors to achieve broad-based reforms of policy and government (Joshi and Quinn 2015). An agreement with few provisions leaves most government sectors unaffected and is thus unlikely to motivate conflict parties, particularly the broader rebel constituency, to disarm, demobilize, and commit to agreement implementation. Research further suggests that a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), which represents the culmination of all previous negotiations and agreed-upon terms, can make securing peace more likely (Joshi et al. 2015). Apart from the number and scope of peace agreement provisions, the extent to which provisions are implemented emerges as the strongest predictor of peace durability (Joshi and Quinn 2017).

In sum, peace processes with broad societal support, agreements with a high number of provisions that represent a sociopolitical reform agenda, and high implementation rates for agreement provisions during the postconflict period most likely result in durable peace.

### **Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and Durable Peace**

Statistical research on women's participation and durable peace is limited to date. Caprioli, Nielsen, and Hudson (2010) examined several cases and provided preliminary evidence that postconflict peace is more durable when women participate directly in negotiations. Laurel Stone's (2014) logistic regression analysis of the impact of women's participation in peace processes and durable peace found both a positive and a negative impact. She coded peace agreement documents for women's inclusion in the agreement agenda, and women's participation as negotiator, mediator, witness, or signatory. Her findings were mixed, indicating "limited significance in general," but a "predicted probability (. . .) that increasing women's participation could increase the probability of violence ending within one year by 24.9 percent" (Stone 2014: 28). By contrast, we use survival analysis for a more accurate analysis of peace durability and only focus on the impact of women

signatories to exclude measuring the impact of women delegates who may not have been able to meaningfully participate in negotiations.

Research on gender inequality and armed conflict, and on women's political participation after war, found a strong link between the political inclusion of women and the durability of peace. Gender inequality is a strong predictor of armed conflict, which suggests that there is a connection between women's security, the political participation of women, and durable peace. Gender equality has been shown to be a strong indicator of a state's peacefulness (Hudson et al. 2012, 2009) and gender inequality a strong predictor of civil war onset (Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005). In societies where women do comparatively better, prospects for successful peacebuilding operations increase because women can express a voice in the peace-making process and elicit broader domestic participation (Gizelis 2009). A higher proportion of female representatives in the national legislature prolongs peace after a ceasefire or negotiated settlement (Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017).

Based on this research, we test the following two hypotheses:

H1: Women's direct participation in peace negotiations—measured as female signatories—increases the durability of peace.

H2: Women's direct participation in peace negotiations—measured as female signatories—increases the quality of peace.

### **Linkages: Peace Processes, Women Negotiators, and Women Civil Society Groups**

Why would the presence of female signatories increase the quality and the durability of peace? We argue that *linkages* between women signatories and women civil society groups improve accord content and implementation of accord provisions. Linkages between female signatories and women civil society groups result in more accord provisions aimed at sociopolitical change and greater provision implementation rates due to sustained advocacy by well-informed women groups, thus making durable peace more likely.

Feminist researchers have long argued that the end of armed conflict does not automatically translate into improved security for women and that a meaningful peace must take women's protection and women's rights into account (Chinkin 2003; Meintjes, Pillay and Turshen 2001; Pankhurst 2003, 2008). Apart from rights-based arguments for women's inclusion, scholars have emphasized women's social knowledge, conflict expertise, grassroots networks, perceptions of femininity, and experiences during war (Anderlini 2007; Cockburn 2007; El-Bushra 2007; Kaufman and Williams 2010; Krause and Enloe 2015). However, it remains unclear if perceptions of femininity

and community-level conflict management skills translate directly into a positive impact on state-level peace negotiations. Furthermore, women are not a homogenous group. Female delegates from different backgrounds may hold very different understandings of peace and pursue distinct priorities and agendas. There are also important distinctions to be made in how women enter the peace process and negotiate their goals, and what women networks emerge and endure (Chang et al. 2015).

Our argument proceeds from the diversity of women groups. Women's participation as signatories allows them to establish and strengthen *linkages* to women civil society groups with strong connections to the grassroots level. Conflict zones contain many movements, initiatives, and networks built by women to address not only humanitarian and practical but also political issues (Chinkin 2003: 10). Women civil society groups often build on the transformation in gender relations, which are particularly severe after long civil wars. Women signatories can become *brokers* who connect local-level women civil society networks to track-one negotiations. Brokers are individuals who bridge gaps in social structures and facilitate the flow of goods, information, or knowledge across that gap (Burt 2005; Stovel and Shaw 2012: 140). They connect actors across systems of social, economic, or political relations (Stovel, Golub, and Milgrom 2011). Although they often rely on informal and personal relationships, their actions can have significant macro-level consequences because network reconfigurations alter processes of social integration (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 140).

*Linkages* between women with access to the negotiations and a diverse set of women civil society groups not only broaden societal support for the peace process. They also inform the negotiations on specific issues and agendas that can lead to the inclusion of provisions for shaping sociopolitical reform. Beyond the immediate end of armed hostilities, peace negotiations lay the groundwork for the postconflict political, economic, and social order. Groups excluded from negotiations often remain marginalized in postconflict politics. As a result, provisions for women's rights and gender equality, and other issues relating to socioeconomic reform, are largely absent from peace agreement texts (Bell and O'Rourke 2010: 954; Ellerby 2015: 186). Female delegates may initially not be aware of gender issues but can become partners for women civil society activists if connections are carefully built and maintained. As delegates who can directly influence negotiations, they are in a much stronger position to push for women's rights and provisions that overall improve women's socioeconomic position than women groups who are relegated to observer status. At the same time, pressure from women civil society groups at the fringe of negotiations can strengthen the position of women delegates. Women delegates can support advocacy by providing women civil society groups with information about the negotiation process so that they can effectively mobilize and create momentum.

Beyond the inclusion of specific provisions in peace agreements, women networks, collaboration, and knowledge building during peace negotiations



also result in strong networks that can advocate for the implementation of provisions during the postconflict period, which is vital for a successful peace process. Peace negotiations are embedded within a broader peace process that can span years with distinct negotiation stages. Agreements can consist of different types of documents: pre-negotiation agreements, framework/substantive agreements, and implementation/renegotiation agreements (Bell 2006: 376). In some peace processes, issues are negotiated in several separate agreements and are then brought together or ratified by a comprehensive final agreement. Implementation agreements often follow peace agreements and involve new negotiations and renegotiations, in part because parties to the process “test whether they can claw back concessions made at an earlier stage” (Bell 2006: 378). Strong and well-informed women networks are crucial for the inclusion of agreement provisions that redress inequality and sociopolitical structures, and for advocacy during the postconflict law-making and implementation period to hold all stakeholders to account.

Our argument extends previous research on the positive impact of civil society inclusion in negotiations. It is important to take the gendered nature of civil society and political activism into account because it can put women groups at a disadvantage. Men tend to hold the majority of leading positions in civil society organizations. Women’s activism depends on their socioeconomic position, particularly the structural conditions of family relations, income generation, and access to state institutions (Paffenholz 2015: 2). Thus, even when peace negotiations allow for the consultation of civil society groups or offer civil society groups a seat at the table, such gender-unspecific mechanisms of participation do not automatically ensure that local women groups are heard and their demands incorporated into agreements and political decision making. Certainly, male delegates can also collaborate with women civil society groups, but women delegates tend to be the primary brokers for women networks.

In sum, if women cannot participate in negotiations with a voice and influence, important networks between negotiators and women civil society groups are unlikely to be established or remain weak. The lack of women’s direct participation reduces chances that provisions aimed at gender equality and socioeconomic development are included in the peace agreement and that they are implemented in the years after the peace agreement. Thus, women’s exclusion from negotiations perpetuates their political marginalization, reduces chances for political reform and for the implementation of the peace agreement, thus undermining the durability of peace.

## Research Design

Our empirical strategy combines quantitative and qualitative analysis in a three-step process. We first test whether we find a statistically significant relationship between women’s direct participation in negotiations and the

durability of peace. Second, based on our findings, we analyze descriptive statistics of accord content and implementation rates to examine whether peace agreements with women signatories resulted in a better quality of peace and higher implementation rates. Better accord content and higher implementation rates not only improve the quality of a peace accord but also the likelihood of durable peace. Lastly, we use qualitative case study evidence to demonstrate that in all peace processes with female signatories, linkages to women civil society groups were built.

Women's participation in peace processes can take various forms, including direct participation as delegates and indirect participation as observers, consultants, or witnesses. Women's roles and influence in indirect forms of participation and as delegates without signature can vary significantly from case to case. We use a narrow approach and only code female signatories to peace agreements in order to measure women's meaningful participation as best as possible. Furthermore, we exclude women signatories who represent international third parties from our analysis because our proposed mechanism for explaining women's positive impact on peace durability is based on the inclusion of country-level women networks and their political participation, and not on the mere presence of women.

## **Data**

We employ data from the UCDP, which provides information on 216 peace agreements from 1975 until 2011. Unless otherwise stated, all data used in this article come from the UCDP (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006; Högbladh 2011; Pettersson and Eck 2018). Many peace processes include several subsequent agreements, and some are designed to address specific issues. The UCDP peace agreement data set includes full, partial, and process agreements. Since process agreements only deal with regulating the peace negotiations without directly affecting the actual peace agreements, we only include full and partial peace agreements in our analysis. Furthermore, if a peace process included several partial peace agreements before a durable agreement was reached, we censored these partial agreements. Several full peace agreements signed by female delegates belong to peace processes that included partial peace agreements that women also signed. Hence, we excluded all durable partial peace agreements followed by a durable final agreement from our analysis in order not to overestimate the effect of women's participation. If women signed one or more partial agreements but not the full peace agreement of the same peace process, we still coded the full peace agreement as signed by a woman and excluded the partial agreements from the analysis.

Since the end of the Cold War, peace processes and postconflict peace building have been oriented around the notion of the "liberal peace," with a

focus on democracy, free-market economies, and the protection of human rights (Barnett 2006; Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009). Many more UN peacekeeping missions were deployed and peacekeeping evolved as a tool to maintain peace after civil war (Fortna and Howard 2008: 284). Given this significant change in the international environment, we focus only on peace agreements concluded from 1989.<sup>1</sup> Given the prevalence of civil wars since 1990s, our data set only includes peace agreements that followed intra-state conflicts. All in all, after excluding censored partial peace agreements and peace agreements not resulting from civil wars, our database consists of 82 peace agreements in 42 armed conflicts between 1989 and 2011.

### **Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is *durability of peace* measured in days without armed conflict from the signing of the peace agreement to the beginning of renewed fighting.<sup>2</sup> The variable *durability of peace* takes into account the behavior of the signatory parties and other armed groups within the same conflict who may not have signed the peace accord.<sup>3</sup> In the case of a durable peace agreement, the number of days until the end of the year 2011 (the end of the observation period) was counted.

### **Independent Variable**

Our independent variable of interest is *women signatories* to peace agreements. This variable includes female government or rebel group representatives and civil society representatives but excludes third-party representatives. The UCDP data set only lists the signatories of a peace agreement but did not code their sex. This information was also not available from other data sets, such as the Transitional Justice Institute Peace Agreement Database and the UN Peacemaker Peace Agreements Database. We cross-checked signatories' names recorded in the UCDP peace agreement database with information from the UN Peacemaker database to verify and code female delegates' signatures to peace agreements.

Our data set includes a total of only 13 peace agreements with women signatories in 6 peace processes: the DR Congo (2003), El Salvador (1992), Guatemala (1996), Liberia (2003), Papua New Guinea (2001), and the UK/Northern Ireland (1998).

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<sup>1</sup>Three of the pre-1989 agreements excluded concern Chad, and we could not verify whether or not women signed the agreement. The remaining five agreements concern Uganda (1985; 1988), Sudan (1988), The Philippines/Mindanao (1976), and India/Tripura (1988), all of which lacked women signatories.

<sup>2</sup>Note that all peace agreements are observed as of the 12 months following the peace agreement.

<sup>3</sup>Note that this concerns only armed groups who are active in the same incompatibility, and not actors in other conflicts within the same country.

As a first inspection, a log rank test indicates a significant difference in survival times between peace agreements with and without female signatories. This finding supports our hypothesis that women's participation in peace negotiations increases the durability of peace.<sup>4</sup>

### Control Variables

Our control variables are divided into three groups. The first group consists of factors relating to the armed conflict: *conflict duration*, *intensity of conflict*, *the number of warring parties*, and *conflict issue*. All of these variables have been found to affect the durability of peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 2004). The variable *conflict duration* counts the number of years since the beginning of the armed conflict until the peace agreement. *Conflict intensity* has been coded on a continuous scale as the share of conflict years with more than 1000 battle-related deaths compared with the total number of conflict years. The variable *warring parties* captures the number of parties active in the conflict.<sup>5</sup> The variable *conflict issue* has further been associated with the durability of peace in various studies and was coded as 0 if the conflict was fought over territory and 1 if the conflict was fought over government control.

The second group of covariates refers to characteristics of the peace agreements themselves. *Power sharing* has been shown to have a significant impact on the durability of peace (DeRouen et al. 2009; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Hartzell et al. 2001; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Mukherjee 2006). Most peace agreements since 1989 include some provisions for military, political, and territorial power sharing. We coded *power sharing* along these three dimensions (military, political, territorial power sharing) and constructed an additive measure ranging from 0 to 3 depending on the number of power-sharing provisions included in the peace accords. Research has further shown that CPAs tend to be more durable because the warring parties enter a prolonged negotiation process and resolve outstanding issues in several partial agreements that are then ratified in a final accord (Joshi et al. 2015). Therefore, we also control for CPAs, which is a binary variable stating whether or not a peace agreement counts as a CPA. We also control for the inclusion of *civil society* in the peace negotiations, defined as peace agreement “provisions specifically addressed at the inclusion of civil society, for example, through Peace Building Commissions, or through general calls for inclusion.”<sup>6</sup> Data have been coded from the Transitional Justice Peace

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<sup>4</sup>The corresponding Kaplan–Meier plot can be found in the Appendix (Figure A.1). The plot indicates that peace agreements signed by women resulted in significantly longer periods of peace when compared to peace agreements not signed by women. The probability of no renewed fighting after 20 years of peace is about 70% if women signed the peace agreement, while it is only about 25% otherwise.

<sup>5</sup>This variable takes into account rebel groups that ceased to exist, merged, or were newly created during the conflict period.

<sup>6</sup><http://www.peaceagreements.ulster.ac.uk/glossary.html>.

Agreement Database, and missing peace agreements were coded according to the texts available in the UCDP and the UN Peacemaker databases.

Third, the international and domestic environment is likely to affect the durability of peace. Here, we took into account the presence or absence of a *UN peacekeeping* mission.<sup>7</sup> This binary variable is coded time-variant.<sup>8</sup> We further controlled for the domestic environment in which women and other civil society groups operate (Nilsson 2012). Our additional control variable *political rights* was coded from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (2015). We used the variable *empowerment rights*, which is an index ranging from 0 to 14. The value 0 indicates that the country does not respect basic political rights, whilst the value 14 indicates that the country fully respects these abovementioned rights. In addition to levels of empowerment and the international environment, we also control for the level of democratic development, which has been shown to correlate with the durability of peace (Fortna 2008: 117). Data for the variable *democracy* have been collected from the Political Instability Task Force data set (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016).<sup>9</sup> Research has also demonstrated links between gender inequality and levels of economic development (Hudson et al. 2009). We used data provided by the World Bank to include the log value of *GDP per capita*. Both variables, *democracy* and *GDP per capita*, are lagged by 1 year to avoid endogeneity problems.

We add a number of variables that refer to the level of gender equality and women's political influence within a conflict-affected country. Previous studies have argued that the number of female legislators may also positively influence the durability of peace (Caprioli et al. 2010: 100; Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017). We control for the percentage of *female legislators* to ensure that we do not measure the effect of women's legislative participation as the effect of women's participation in peace negotiations. We combine data compiled by Paxton, Green, and Hughes (2008), complemented by data available from the World Bank.<sup>10</sup> We can further assume that rebel groups that include female combatants and women in leadership positions may be more likely to allow for women's political participation and generally support norms of gender equality, which can have an independent effect on the durability of peace. We therefore control for the numbers of *female combatants* in rebel groups, using data collected by Thomas and Wood (2017). We use a categorical indicator ranging from 0 to 3, accounting for the estimated proportion of an armed group's combat force that comprises women

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<sup>7</sup>This information is available on the UN website: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>.

<sup>8</sup>We also included a continuous variable measuring the number of UN troops and police forces in the country. The data were taken from Kathman (2013). See Table A.2 in Appendix for the results.

<sup>9</sup>We coded a value lower than 5 as nondemocratic (=0), a value of 5–9 as democratic (=1), and the value 10 as fully democratic (=2).

<sup>10</sup>Less than 5% female legislators was coded as 0; thereafter, we coded percentages between 5% and 15% as 1, 15% and 30% as 2, 30% and 50% as 3, and more than 50% as 4.

(Thomas and Wood 2017: 8).<sup>11</sup> Finally, given that leftist insurgency groups often have much higher numbers of women both among their fighters and within their political wing and are more likely to support norms of gender equality and women's empowerment, we also control for *leftist ideology* among rebel groups.<sup>12</sup> The variable *gender quotas* was coded from the Women and Peace Agreements database.<sup>13</sup> The binary variable indicates whether or not a peace agreement specified a commitment to gender quotas or particular numbers of women in electoral or other bodies.

We estimate the effect of female signatories on the durability of peace by employing a Cox proportional hazard model. This decision is justified because of the less restrictive theoretical assumptions relating to the distribution of the duration times. Therefore, the Cox model is widely considered superior to fully parametric models—such as the Weibull or Gompertz regression. This approach demands that hazards are proportional over time in order to give valid results. We tested this assumption using Schoenfeld residuals. If violated, we interacted the covariate in question with the logarithm of analysis time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 132–136). After doing so, no violations could be found for any of the covariates.

## Women's Participation and the Durability of Peace: Statistical Analysis and Results

Does direct participation by women in negotiations, as indicated by women signatories, increase the durability of peace? The results of the statistical analyses are shown in Table 1. All models control for the main country and conflict characteristics and each model tests the effect of one additional variable separately. We limit the models to a maximum of nine covariates to avoid over-fitting of the model. The demonstrated effect of the independent variable remains constant even if we control for all covariates in one model (see model 1 in Table A.1 in Appendix).<sup>14</sup>

Our models ascertain whether we find a relationship between women signatories and the durability of peace. Our independent variable, female signatories, has a statistically significant effect at the 0.01 level in all models and reduces the likelihood of peace failure. As expected, a higher *GDP per capita* and a higher level of democratic development consistently impact the durability of peace positively. Only the inclusion of the variable *female legislators* neutralizes the positive effect of a higher *GDP per capita*. The variables *female combatants* and

<sup>11</sup>If no female combatants were present, the variable was coded as 0, in the case of less than 5% as 1, for 5–20% as 2, and if more than 20% were present as 3.

<sup>12</sup>This information was also taken from the data set provided by Thomas and Wood (2017).

<sup>13</sup>See <http://www.politicalsettlements.org/research/pax-women/>.

<sup>14</sup>The variables *female combatants* and *leftist ideology* strongly correlate; we therefore only include the former in this model. However, our results remain similar if *leftist ideology* is considered.

Table 1. Women signatories and the durability of peace.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
F. Signatories	0.10*** (-4.71)	0.10*** (-3.60)	0.08*** (-4.71)	0.07*** (-5.40)	0.09*** (-3.17)	0.05*** (-5.05)	0.06*** (-3.12)	0.09*** (-5.15)
C. Duration	1.03 (1.58)	1.04 (1.60)	1.04* (1.78)	1.04 (1.64)	1.06** (2.31)	1.06** (2.55)	1.04 (1.54)	1.04* (1.94)
C. Intensity	0.49 (-0.73)	0.49 (-0.73)	0.50 (-0.73)	0.45 (-0.79)	0.75 (-0.27)	0.77 (-0.27)	0.49 (-0.71)	0.43 (-0.85)
Warring parties	0.99 (-0.23)	0.99 (-0.16)	0.99 (-0.24)	0.99 (-0.24)	0.99 (-0.34)	0.92* (-1.72)	1.00 (-0.12)	0.98 (-0.62)
Power sharing	1.08 (0.20)	1.03 (0.10)	1.03 (0.10)	1.09 (0.25)	0.85 (-0.48)	0.93 (-0.21)	1.02 (0.06)	0.94 (-0.21)
Democracy	0.29*** (-2.20)	0.29*** (-2.17)	0.22*** (-2.63)	0.29*** (-2.31)	0.23** (-2.40)	0.14** (-2.34)	0.27*** (-2.12)	0.27*** (-2.24)
GDP (log)	0.30*** (-2.00)	0.31* (-1.90)	0.23*** (-2.18)	0.29* (-1.92)	0.37 (-1.57)	0.13** (-2.44)	0.30*** (-1.97)	0.33* (-1.75)
Political rights	0.90 (-1.19)	0.90 (-1.26)	0.89 (-1.30)	0.91 (-0.89)	0.93 (-0.93)	0.88 (-1.44)	0.91 (-1.14)	0.92 (-1.06)
CPA	0.86 (-0.33)							
Civil society		0.90 (-0.25)						
C. Issue			0.47 (-1.15)					
UNPKO				0.15 (-1.07)				
F. Legislators					0.57*** (-2.81)			
F. Combatants						0.55** (-2.54)		
Quotas							1.68 (0.74)	
Leftist ideology								0.29 (-0.86)
UNPKO $\times \ln(t)$				1.47 (1.32)				
Observations	406	406	406	406	396	346	406	393
Number of subjects	67	67	67	67	66	59	67	66
Log likelihood	-134.22	-134.26	-133.62	-132.79	-124.69	-110.19	-134.07	-132.65

Note: A Cox proportional hazards model was employed. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are reported, with t-statistics given in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \* $p < .1$ ; clustered in conflict.

**Table 2.** Final agreements of peace processes with female signatories.

	UNPKO	P-IV	GDP (log)	Fem. L.	Fem. C.	GQ	PR	CPA	CI	LI	CS
DR Congo (2003)	1	0	2.24	1	1	1	3	0	1	0	1
El Salvador (1992)	1	1	3.00	1	3	0	10	1	1	1	1
Guatemala (1996)	0	0	3.15	1	2	0	10	1	1	1	1
Liberia (2003)	1	0	2.25	1	3	1	6	1	1	0	1
Papua New Guinea (2001)	0	0	2.80	0	0	1	10	1	0	0	1
UK/N.-Ireland (1998)	0	2	4.43	2	2	0	11	1	0	0	1

Note: P-IV: Democracy; Fem. L.: Female Legislators; Fem. C.: Female Combatants; GQ: Gender Quotas; PR: Political Rights; CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement; CI: Conflict Issue; LI: Leftist Ideology; CS: Civil Society.

*female legislators* equally affect peace durability positively and the results are statistically significant. In model 2, the mentioning of *civil society* in peace agreement texts shows a positive impact on peace durability but does not reach statistical significance.<sup>15</sup> None of the further covariates indicates a statistically significant effect on peace duration.

As an additional robustness check, we used a Weibull model (see model 2 in Table A.1 in Appendix), and our results remain the same. All in all, the presented statistical analysis finds a robust effect of female signatories on the durability of peace. The wide range of control variables used in the presented models limits the risk for spurious correlations. We therefore conclude that the effect of female signatories on peace durability cannot be reduced to the positive effect of the percentage of women in parliament, the number of female combatants, adoption of gender quotas, or the general inclusion of civil society.

### **Selection Bias and Women's Access to Peace Negotiations**

Does the identified correlation between women signatories and durability of peace result from selection bias? Are women more likely to receive access to peace negotiations in conflicts that may be more predisposed to a durable negotiated settlement? We assess this question by examining the determinants of female involvement in peace negotiations in more detail (Table 2). Female signatories in our study include female members of the political wing of armed groups (El Salvador, Guatemala), female government representatives (Guatemala), and female civil society activists (UK/Northern Ireland, Papua New Guinea, DR Congo, Liberia). Thus, women followed different access strategies to the negotiations, making selection bias less likely. All peace agreements except for the DRC (2003) have been classified as CPAs in the PAM, meaning that they have been coded as having the major parties to the conflict involved and substantive issues underlying the disputes included (Joshi et al. 2015). Nevertheless, both variables, *female signatories* and *CPA*, only correlate poorly with each other (Pearson's

<sup>15</sup>In the full model, civil society shows a negative impact on peace durability and reaches statistical significance. We also tested the effect of civil society on peace durability independently of female signatories for the main model and the full model. The results remain the same but civil society does not reach statistical significance (see Table A.3 in Appendix).



$R = .24$ ). In our model, a *CPA* shows no significant effect on the durability of peace (see also Joshi et al. 2015). This also holds true if we exclude the female signatories measure from the models.<sup>16</sup> However, we assume that the negotiation structure of partial accords ratified in one comprehensive accord may offer female delegates multiple entry points into the negotiation process. For example, in the case of Guatemala, women did not sign the final accord but partial peace agreements that were ratified within the final accord.

International mediators may push warring parties to include female delegates, and internationalized peace agreements may be more likely to have female signatories. Indeed, for the case of the 2003 DRC peace agreement, international actors provided significant support and training to female delegates and facilitated women's participation. Generally, however, research has also demonstrated that international mediator involvement does not necessarily result in more durable peace.<sup>17</sup> Consequently, international mediation support in and of itself cannot account for the correlation between female signatories and peace durability.

Four of the six agreements with female signatories ended conflicts with high numbers of female combatants. However, only in El Salvador and Guatemala did female members of rebel groups gain access to the peace negotiations while in Liberia, it was women civil society groups who gained entry due to their extensive mobilization.

In sum, no common pattern for the inclusion of female signatories in peace negotiations can be detected. While we cannot fully exclude the possibility of selection bias with our relatively small number of peace agreements with female signatories, based on the previous reasoning, we find this explanation unlikely to fully account for our statistical results.


## **Women's Participation and the Quality of Peace: Descriptive Statistics of Peace Agreement Provisions and Implementation**

The second step of our analysis examines whether peace agreements with women signatories show a high number of agreement provisions, and whether a higher implementation rate for provisions can be detected. The PAM provides data on annualized implementation rates for 51 provisions in 34 CPAs negotiated for civil wars since 1989 (Joshi et al. 2015). Five of our six peace processes with women signatories—El Salvador (1992), Guatemala (1996), the UK/Northern Ireland (1998), Papua New Guinea (2001), and Liberia (2003)—are included with a 10-year implementation rate. Figure 1 demonstrates that along 51 agreement provision categories, agreements with female signatories include more agreement provisions for 34 categories, compared to agreements without female signatories.

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<sup>16</sup>See Table A.3 in Appendix.

<sup>17</sup>See for example Beardsley (2008: 723): “[M]ediation can create artificial incentives that, as the mediator's influence wanes and the combatants' demands change, leave the actors with an agreement less durable than one that would have been achieved without mediation”.



**Figure 1.** Share of provisions and provisions' implementation rates for comprehensive peace agreements with/without female signatories.

In particular, agreements without female signatories included more provisions with regard to military reform and withdrawal of troops, while agreements with female signatories included a maximum of provisions with regard to political, social, and economic reform.

Furthermore, agreements with female signatories also demonstrate a significantly higher implementation rate for provisions per category. For only ten categories do agreements without women signatories show a higher implementation rate. If we consider peace agreement provisions related to social peace compared to security-related provisions (Lee, MacGinty and Joshi 2016), we find

that for most provisions related to social peace, agreements with female signatories include a significantly higher share of provisions than those without female signatories, and a better implementation rate. Lastly, CPAs with female signatories show an overwhelmingly better score for the implementation of women's rights, providing further evidence that women's direct participation increases the durability of peace by reducing gender equality after civil war, which is a strong predictor of (renewed) armed conflict.<sup>18</sup>

Figure 2 compares the overall implementation rates for these five comprehensive agreements with the other 29 agreements without female signatories. Overall, agreements with women signatories scored very high on the implementation rate, with Guatemala as the agreement with the lowest score still reaching 70%. In aggregate, agreements with women signatories show a median implementation rate of 89.3% compared to 76.9% for agreements without them. Three quarters of all agreements without a female signatory reach an implementation score below 89.3%, while the other six agreements score beyond this point. We can, moreover, conclude that no agreement with a female signatory has stalled in the implementation process.

In sum, these numbers on agreement provisions and provision implementation rates substantiate our argument that women's direct inclusion in peace negotiations increases the quality and thereby durability of peace. Women networks




Figure 2. Comprehensive peace agreements 10-year implementation rates.

<sup>18</sup>If we compare these findings on numbers of agreement provisions with data from the UCDP data set (see Figure A.2 in Appendix), we similarly find that agreements with female signatories show more provisions with regard to political, social, and economic reform but less provisions with regard to military reform (ceasefires; integration of rebel groups into the army). However, the data allow for a less comprehensive understanding because for a significant number of provision categories, very few agreements include provisions, and those signed by women include none (for example local power-sharing and rebel group integration in civil service).

support the inclusion and the implementation of provisions that are likely to lead to political reform and improve women's status, thereby reducing the risk of renewed civil war.

### **The Mechanism: Linkages Between Women Signatories and Women Civil Society Groups**

Lastly, we examine whether female signatories to peace agreements did indeed maintain linkages to women civil society groups during peace negotiations. Our data set includes 13 partial or full peace agreements signed by female delegates for peace processes in 6 countries: El Salvador (1992), Guatemala (1996), the UK/Northern Ireland (1998), Papua New Guinea (2001), the DRC (2003), and Liberia (2003). In **El Salvador**, female signatories represented the rebel group Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Many women civil society activists had strong ties to the FMLN and publicly challenged the negotiating parties to incorporate women's concerns and demands during the formal peacebuilding process (St. Germain 1997). During the post-accord negotiations over reintegration programs, women groups alerted female negotiators to discrimination against women, and female representatives were able to rectify the situation. This resulted in the inclusion of female ex-combatants and civilian women in the reintegration programs, and one-third of the land transfer program beneficiaries were women (Stephen, Cosgrove and Ready 2000; Conaway and Martínez 2004).

In **Guatemala**, two women—Teresa Bolanos de Zarco and Luz Mendez—were included in the negotiating teams of the rebel group Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and the government. Women's civil society groups established regular dialogue with Luz Mendez, who acted as a broker to voice their concerns (UN Women 2012). The peace agreement included provisions for women's equal access to land, credit and productive resources, health care, and education and training (Karam 2000). The collaboration between Mendez and civil society groups also supported the perceived legitimacy of the peace talks among wider social networks (Reimann et al. 2013: 6).

During the **UK/Northern Ireland** negotiations, female signatories represented the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and the government. Female representatives of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition acted as channels for bicomunal civil society involvement in the official peacemaking process and were able to broaden the negotiations to include victim's rights and reconciliation (Fearon 2002). Through monthly meetings with the women's coalition, female delegates informed a broad network of women about the development of the negotiations and proposals to be tabled during negotiations. Furthermore, the women's coalition played a key role in promoting the

Belfast agreement during the public referendum, thus significantly contributing to its perceived legitimacy and its implementation (Fearon 1999, 2002).

In **Papua New Guinea**, Ruby Miringka, the only female delegate, was well linked to women civil society groups. Women groups advocated for their distinct agenda, which included broader social developments such as better communication and transportation services and the inclusion of non-governmental organizations and churches in the rehabilitation programs (Chinkin 2003: 14). Miringka announced the peace agreement to women groups, thus increasing the perceived legitimacy of the accord. Despite strong links to women's civil society groups, however, Miringka had limited impact on the content of negotiations or the inclusion of provisions for women's political participation (Heathcote 2014).

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**, women participated in the 2003 inter-Congolese negotiations as representatives of the parties to the conflict, political parties, and civil society groups. Female delegates counted for 9% of all delegates and were trained in a pre-negotiation workshop. In addition, an expert group of women accompanied the negotiations and advised on issues such as security sector governance and constitutional law. Female delegates relied on this expert group for advice and consultation, and women from both groups formed a women's caucus as an informal mechanism to ensure that gender equality issues were addressed at the Inter Congolese Dialogue (Wijeyaratne 2009). The peace agreement text reflected some of the priorities of the Congolese women active in the peace process, and the transitional constitution recognized the need for women's political participation (Mpoumou 2004).

Lastly, we examine these linkages in more detail for the case of **Liberia**. The successful and transformative women's peace movement in Liberia has been well documented. During the peace talks in Ghana in 2003, women from the Mano River Women's Peace Network took part as official delegates among civil society delegates. Liberian women from all parts of society were mobilized by the Liberia section of the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) for a "Mass Action for Peace" around the simple and effective message: "We Want Peace; No More War." They called for an immediate ceasefire and a negotiated settlement, and in their advocacy campaign forged links to other civil society actors (Barnes 2006). When the peace talks commenced, women activists sat outside the hall with placards calling for an end to the violence. WIPNET organized a parallel Women's Forum to assess progress in the negotiations and to advocate for issues of importance to Liberian women and citizens more widely. They met regularly with delegates from all parties to discuss issues and make recommendations (Barnes 2006: 44–45). WIPNET fully supported and worked with the Mano River Women's Peace Network, whose delegates directly took part in the negotiations and provided women activists outside the talks with information

so that they could agitate on the same issues from beyond the negotiating table (Tripp 2015). When the talks stalled, women barricaded the negotiation team to enforce renewed negotiations. WIPNET was subsequently asked to participate in meetings, including those of the political and security committee. The peace agreement included the formulation that women should be part of the Governance Reform Commission and that the National Transitional Legislative Assembly should include members from women's organizations (Chinkin and Charlesworth 2006).

After the civil war, women activists drew on skills and networks developed during the mobilization and peace negotiations to further advocate for women's political representation (Adams 2008). WIPNET used its knowledge of the peace negotiations and organized workshops that explained the content of the agreement to civil society groups and particularly engaged women in its implementation. WIPNET also established timelines and benchmarks to measure progress of the implementation of provisions (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). When the disarmament process stalled, WIPNET members travelled to disarmament camps and convinced fighters to lay down their arms. Collaboration between different women civil society groups was also crucial for the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to the presidency. She had strong ties to the women's movement and had pushed for language on gender equality in the peace agreement. The linkages between women delegates and civil society groups outside the talks were also instrumental in mobilizing women to vote for Johnson-Sirleaf. The strong women's peace movement was a precursor to a later mobilization around women's rights and political power (Tripp 2015: 113).

In sum, we find evidence that in all cases of successful peace processes with female signatories, women delegates actively collaborated and built linkages to women civil society groups. Overall, linkages resulted in networks that included a diverse range of female political actors and activists, ranging from former combatants and government representatives to women civil society activists.

## Conclusion

In this article, we have shown that women's participation in peace negotiations with voice and influence leads to better accord content, higher agreement implementation rates, and longer lasting peace. Our statistical results show a robust relationship between peace agreements with women signatories and peace durability. This relationship holds after controlling for conflict characteristics and the level of political and economic development, UN peacekeeping, the numbers of women in parliament and in rebel groups, gender quotas, and general civil society inclusion. We further find that peace agreements signed by women show a significantly higher number of

agreement provisions and a higher implementation rate of these provisions than those not signed by women. Previous research has demonstrated that both accord quality and provision implementation rates emerge as the strongest predictors of peace durability; women's direct inclusion with voice in negotiations improves both accord quality and provision implementation rates.

However, few women have received direct access to peace negotiations: between 1989 and 2011, female delegates signed only 13 peace agreements in 6 peace processes. The numbers of female signatories have even decreased since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Despite the small number of peace agreements signed by women to date, our results clearly demonstrate that peace processes are more likely to lead to durable peace if women have been able to shape them.

We have argued that linkages between female signatories and women civil society groups explain the positive impact of women's participation on peace durability. Linkages between diverse women groups are crucial for informing the negotiation process and inclusion of provisions that address social inequalities—and in particular gender inequality. The women networks that arise from such collaboration during negotiations, and the knowledge and expertise gained from participating in negotiations, are vital for effective advocacy of women networks for the implementation of peace agreement provisions. Strong linkages and collaboration between women signatories deeply familiar with the negotiation process and its political constellation, and women civil society groups with local expertise, improve the quality and the durability of peace after civil war.

These results underline that ensuring women's right to participation in peacemaking and peacebuilding cannot be equated with inserting gender-sensitive language into peace agreement texts. Recent research suggests that it is often peace agreements with the most holistic references to women that suffer from chronic implementation failures because these tend to be highly internationalized accords with little real agreement between the conflict parties (Bell 2015: 4). Our findings further imply that the policy discourse on women's inclusion in peace processes needs to take the diversity of women groups and potential female delegates into account. Attention has predominantly focused on including women civil society activists in peace negotiations (O'Reilly et al. 2015; Reimann 2013). Less attention has been paid to the potential roles of female combatants, women within the political wing of an armed group, and female government representatives during peace negotiations. However, female delegates who signed peace agreements at times represented the government or rebel group, and not only civil society. Collaboration between women delegates and women civil society groups broadens the civilian support base for peace and results in networks that can persistently advocate for the adoption of policies that empower

women. More research is needed into the dynamics of women networks, knowledge building, and policymaking during peace processes. Future research should examine in more detail the quality of civil society access and involvement in peace negotiations and its impact on the durability of peace. We conclude that including women directly in peace negotiations with voice is not only a matter of justice but also of effectiveness, quality, and sustainability of peace.

## Acknowledgments

This research was financially supported by the Swiss Program for Research on Global Issues for Development (r4d) “The Gender Dimensions of Social Conflict, Armed Violence and Peacebuilding.” We thank the participants of the Folke Bernadotte Academy 2015 workshop on UNSCR 1325, the 2015 “Gender Dimensions of Conflict and Peacebuilding” workshop at the Graduate Institute Geneva, and the 2016 “Gender and Security in Violent Contexts” Conference at Hebrew University, as well as Louise Olsson, Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, Ragnhild Nordas, Zoe Marks, Håvard Hegre, Alexander Schmotz, Ursula Daxecker, the three anonymous reviewers, and the editor for their comments and suggestions. Jana Krause thanks Naomi Chazan, Shadia Marhaban, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for insightful discussions of peace negotiations.

## Funding

This work was supported by the Swiss Program for Research on Global Issues for Development [Grant Number 146777].

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
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
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## Appendix



**Figure A.1.** Survival Estimates for Peace Agreements with/without Female Signatories.



**Figure A.2.** Share of Accords in Peace Agreements (UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset).

**Table A.1.** Women Signatories and Peace Durability, Full Model and Weibull Model.

	(1) Full Model	(2) Weibull
F. Signatories	0.020*** (-3.751)	0.032*** (-3.788)
C. Duration	1.097*** (3.563)	1.100*** (3.855)
C. Intensity	1.061 (0.0702)	0.767 (-0.286)
Warring Parties	0.840** (-2.451)	0.843** (-2.221)
Power sharing	1.063 (0.165)	1.042 (0.117)
Democracy	0.069*** (-3.607)	0.091*** (-3.747)
GDP (log)	0.032** (-2.332)	0.059** (-2.486)
Political Rights	0.800 (-1.600)	0.819 (-1.445)
CPA	0.508 (-1.464)	0.353* (-1.952)
C. Issue	0.374 (-1.426)	0.726 (-0.483)
UNPKO	0.091* (-1.655)	0.766 (-0.504)
F. Legislators	0.652** (-2.054)	0.538*** (-2.821)
F. Combatants	0.377** (-2.335)	0.389** (-2.360)
Quotas	0.175 (-1.457)	0.125* (-1.648)
Civil Society	3.489* (1.919)	3.477** (2.000)
UNPKO $\times \ln(t)$	1.459 (1.549)	
Constant		43.95 (1.006)
Observations	318	318
Number of Subjects	54	54
Log likelihood	-75.842	-63.715

Note: The first model shows a Cox proportional hazards model. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are reported, with t statistics given in parentheses. The right column shows the results of a Weibull model. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , clustered in conflict.

**Table A.2.** Women Signatories and Peace Durability, Model with UN Troops.

	Model
F. Signatories	0.055*** (-5.300)
C. Duration	1.041* (1.928)
C. Intensity	0.522 (-0.691)
Warring Parties	0.978 (-0.626)
Power sharing	1.201 (0.604)
Democracy	0.308** (-2.252)
GDP (log)	0.292** (-2.036)
Political Rights	0.897 (-1.113)
UN Troops	0.999*** (-3.279)
UN Troops $\times \ln(t)$	1.000*** (3.677)
Observations	406
Number of Subjects	67
Log likelihood	-130.310
F. Signatories	0.055***

Note: A Cox proportional hazards model was employed. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are reported, with t statistics given in parentheses, \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , clustered in conflict.



**Table A.3.** Robustness: The Impact of Civil Society without Female Signatories.

	(1) Main Model	(2) Full Model
C. Duration	1.022 (1.076)	1.130*** (3.697)
C. Intensity	0.730 (-0.328)	2.325 (0.941)
Warring Parties	1.021 (0.542)	0.717*** (-3.563)
Power sharing	0.954 (-0.163)	0.999 (-0.00219)
Democracy	0.409 (-1.603)	0.301** (-1.983)
GDP (log)	0.376 (-1.641)	0.0814** (-2.248)
Political Rights	0.888 (-1.546)	0.807* (-1.852)
CPA		0.590 (-1.297)
C. Issue		0.867 (-0.194)
UNPKO		0.132* (-1.769)
F. Legislators		0.710* (-1.699)
F. Combatants		0.524* (-1.939)
Quotas		0.351 (-1.053)
Civil Society	0.610 (-1.249)	1.359 (0.486)
C. Duration $\times \ln(t)$		0.984*** (-2.614)
Warring Parties $\times \ln(t)$		1.052*** (3.532)
UNPKO $\times \ln(t)$		1.255 (1.116)
Observations	406	338
Number of Subjects	67	58
Log likelihood	-137.958	-101.906

Note: A Cox proportional hazards model was employed. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are reported, with t statistics given in parentheses, \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , clustered in conflict.